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THE APPEARANCE OF FAIRNESS
DOCTRINE
JOHN E. PHILLIPS*
A wise man once observed that the typical zoning hearing fre-
quently resembles a cross between a New England town meeting and
a hog-calling contest. Most land use attorneys will recognize the
truth of that characterization. Public hearings on zoning matters
often are replete with rabid emotional outbursts, a neglect of substan-
tive issues, and a robust spirit of chaos.
Despite the judiciary's reluctance to interfere with local govern-
mental procedures,' courts gradually have imposed more stringent
due process safeguards on local zoning hearings. Through increased
intervention in local processes, courts have sought to prevent the
figurative "lynchings" of rezone applicants or opponents which often
occur at the hands of an angry audience and a complaisant zoning
board. As a result, judicial review of zoning decisions has extended
beyond the traditional search for "substantial evidence" supporting
the local government's determinations.
Due process in zoning actions has evolved incrementally. First,
courts invalidated zoning actions solely on the common-law procedu-
ral ground of the decisionmaker's direct pecuniary interest in the sub-
ject matter of the dispute.2 Courts then began to overturn actions
* Principal of Hillis, Phillips, Cairncross, Clark & Martin, P.S., Seattle, Washing-
ton. This article was prepared with the assistance of Richard R. Wilson, associate of
the firm, and Sandra L. Cohen, summer associate.
1. See I R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING 2d § 4.01 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as ANDERSON]. Anderson notes that the courts are usually reluctant to review
legislative procedures. He also states, however, that judicial inquiry exists and is jus-
tified when such procedures may result in a denial of due process of law. Id
2. See generally 1 ANDERSON, supra note 1, at § 4.18-20. Anderson discusses the
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because of demonstrated bias.3 Today, some courts require only an
appearance of unfairness in zoning proceedings to overturn the deci-
sions.4
What is "the appearance of fairness"? What makes some interests
or actions permissible while others appear unfair? This article first
presents an overview of the appearance of fairness doctrine's emer-
gence in the state of Washington, whose courts have decided most of
the leading cases discussing the doctrine. This overview will convey
a sense of the kinds of impropriety which have sufficiently offended
judicial notions of fairness to prompt invalidation of local land use
decisions.
Second, this article analyzes the development of the appearance of
fairness doctrine in other states. Each state court alluding to the doc-
trine has taken a somewhat different approach based on local zoning
law.5
I. EVOLUTION OF THE APPEARANCE OF FAIRNESS DOCTRINE
Historically, courts viewed local zoning procedures as legislative in
nature, and therefore presumptively valid.6 The "legislative" label
for zoning matters, including rezoning, precluded searching judicial
review of zoning decisions. Under the doctrine of separation of pow-
ers, 7 courts refused to inquire into the motives of zoning board mem-
bers acting in their legislative capacities.' Thus, a party aggrieved by
historical basis for disqualifying legislators because of their various personal interests.
He notes that examining a legislature's ithotives is exceptional and against the general
rule of judicial restraint in legislative areas.
3. See id
4. See, e.g., notes 31-37 and accompanying text infra.
5. See notes 38-56 and accompanying text infra.
6. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
Zoning is a legislative act, classifying land and creating boundaries. As an exercise
of legislative judgment, zoning decisions should not be disturbed by courts unless the
governing body has exceeded its authority or acted arbitrarily and unreasonably.
Bishop v. Town of Houghton, 69 Wash. 2d 786, 420 P.2d 368 (1966). See generally I
ANDERSON, supra note 1, at § 3.14.
7. Generally speaking, the separation of powers doctrine provides that the legisla-
tive, executive, and judicial branches of government operate independently of one
another. The doctrine preserves the integrity of each governmental branch, protect-
ing the systems of checks and balances, and insuring against domination by any one
branch. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15 (1978).
8. See, e.g., South Gwinnett Venture v. Pruitt, 491 F.2d 5 (5th Cir. 1974), cerl.
denied, 419 U.S. 837 (1974) (holding adoption of a zoning ordinance or an amend-
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a rezone had a nearly insurmountable burden to convince a court to
inspect the basis of the decision.
Until 1969, Washington courts followed the traditional approach.
Public hearings prior to approval of a rezone were part of the legisla-
tive process and thus subject to limited judicial review. 9 In Smith v.
Skagit County,'" the Washington Supreme Court reanalyzed that ap-
proach and established an "appearance of fairness" requirement as
the criterion for a broader judicial review of some zoning proceed-
ings. In subsequent cases, the Washington courts have more fully
developed the appearance of fairness doctrine, emphatically rejecting
the purely legislative characterization of zoning matters.
In Smith, an aluminum processing corporation sought to rezone an
area from residential to industrial." Both the county planning com-
mission and the board of county commissioners held hearings on the
requested zoning change.' 2 The county commissioners granted the
rezone petition.' 3 On appeal, the Washington Supreme Court voided
the action, not only holding the rezone illegal as a spot zone,' 4 but
also invalidating the rezone because of the lack of an appearance of
fairness at the public hearings. The planning commission invited
only advocates of the rezone to a closed session, deliberately exclud-
ing opponents.' 5
The Smith majority' 6 declared that a public hearing on a rezoning
matter "is a situation where appearances are quite as important as
substance."' 7 The court proposed a two-part fairness test governing
zoning proceedings: first, whether a reasonable person attending all
of the meetings on a given issue could conclude that everyone enti-
tled to a hearing obtained one; and second, whether the commissions
ment to a zoning ordinance a state or local quasi-legislative act, and thus not subject
to review unless arbitrary).
9. E.g., Lillions v. Gibbs, 47 Wash. 2d 629, 289 P.2d 203 (1955), overruled in
Fleming v. City of Tacoma, 81 Wash. 2d 292, 502 P.2d 327 (1972).
10. 75 Wash. 2d 715, 453 P.2d 832 (1969).
11. Id at 717, 453 P.2d at 834.
12. Id at 741, 453 P.2d at 847.
13. Id at 737, 453 P.2d at 844.
14. Id at 719, 453 P.2d at 835.
15. Id
16. The court overruled prior case law insulating zoning proceedings from search-
ing procedural review by a five-to-four margin. Id at 758, 453 P.2d at 856.
17. Id at 733, 453 P.2d at 842.
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holding the hearings gave due weight to the matters presented. 8 In
Smith, the county commission failed to meet either part of this test.19
Smith cautiously departed from precedent, continuing to charac-
terize rezone hearings as legislative in nature.2" The court, however,
distinguished these proceedings from other legislative hearings which
do not mandate public participation. Implicit in this distinction was
the court's recognition that rezones are quasi-judicial in character. In
the next appearance of fairness case, Chrobuck v. Snohomish
County,2' the Washington Supreme Court explicitly acknowledged
the adjudicatory nature of rezone hearings.
In Chrobuck, the court applied the appearance of fairness doctrine
to invalidate an individual rezone for an oil reinery. The rezone ap-
plicant improperly influenced several planning commission members
by soliciting their support through a series of pie-hearing contacts.22
These encounters resulted in the court's finding an appearance of un-
fairness which prejudiced the proceedings. 23 Basing its decision on
the prehearing improprieties, and a denial of cross-examination to
rezone opponents at the public hearing,24 the Chrobuck court indi-
cated its willingness to examine the entire decisionmaking process for
18. Id at 741, 453 P.2d at 847.
19. Id
20. In proposing the fairness test, the court clearly retained the legislative charac-
terization. The court stated its test as:
[w]hether a fair-minded person in attendance at all of the meetings on a given
issue, could, at the conclusion thereof, in good conscience say that everyone had
been heard who, in all fairness, should have been heard and that the legislative
body required by law to hold the hearings gave reasonable faith and credit to all
matters presented, according to the weight and force they were in reason entitled
to receive.
Id
21. 78 Wash. 2d 858, 480 P.2d 489 (1971).
22. Id at 863, 480 P.2d at 494. The pre-hearing contacts included trips to Los
Angeles paid for by the applicant and various other social contacts with board mem-
bers.
23. Id at 867, 480 P.2d at 494.
24. Id at 870, 480 P.2d at 496. The court held that there was no absolute cross-
examination requirement in zoning matters. Nevertheless, it found that:
[wlhere the hearing assumes distinctly adversary proportions, the opponents and
proponents are represented by counsel, expert witnesses are called, and complex
technical and disputed factors . . . are involved, it would appear particularly
pertinent to an objective factual evaluation of the testimony presented to permit
cross-examination in a reasonable degree.
[Vol. 20:75
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evidence of procedural abuses.25
In Buell v. City of Bremerton,26 the Washington Supreme Court
further expanded the appearance of fairness doctrine by stengthening
the impartiality requirement for zoning proceedings. The Buell court
invalidated a planning commission rezone vote because of one mem-
ber's possible self-interest even though his vote had no effect on the
result.27 The court held that a showing of interest which might affect
a commission member infected the entire proceeding, requiring no
proof whatsoever of actual influence.28 The court went on to define
three alternative grounds for disqualifying a planning commission
member for appearance of fairness reasons: 1) prejudging issues of
fact; 2) partiality evidencing personal bias or prejudice for or against
a party, as opposed to favoring or disfavoring issues or facts; and 3)
interest in the outcome of a decision.29 Having established these cri-
teria, the state court applied them, upsetting the commission vote.
The court reversed the rezone even though the city council, not the
planning commission, was ultimately responsible for final action in
the matter.3 °
25. Id at 871, 480 P.2d at 497.
26. 80 Wash. 2d 518, 495 P.2d 1358 (1972).
27. "Even if Mr. Beard, in his role as chairman, did not vote, he was found by the
court to have a possibility of interest by virtue of the appreciation in his property
values from the 1971 rezonings." Id at 525, 495 P.2d at 1362. But see King County
Water Dist. v. King County Boundary Rev. Bd., 87 Wash. 2d 536, 554 P.2d 1060
(1976). In King County Water Dist., the City of Des Moines assumed jurisdiction over
the facilities and assets of King County Water District No. 54. In accordance with
Washington law, the city submitted a proposal to the King County Boundary Review
Board. The Board subsequently approved the proposal. An opponent challenged the
Board decision, alleging that a board member's conversations with others associated
with other water systems constituted unfairness. The court rejected his claim, finding
that the alleged exparte contacts did not appear on the record. Further, there was an
absence of any evidence of self-interest on the part of the member. Id at 542, 554
P.2d at 1064.
28. 80 Wash. 2d at 524, 495 P.2d at 1362.
29. Id at 523, 495 P.2d at 1361-62.
The importance of the appearance of fairness has resulted in the recognition that
it is necessary only to show an interest which might have influenced a member of
the commission and not that it actually so affected him.
Id.
30. Id at 524, 495 P.2d at 1363. The court found partiality in the rezone hearing.
Id at 523, 495 P.2d at 1362. Partiality was later more clearly defined in Swift v.
Island County, 87 Wash. 2d 348, 552 P.2d 175 (1976), where the Washington Supreme
Court stated the following test for partiality:
Would a disinterested person, having been apprised of the totality of a board
1980]
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Although arguably the Buell limitations affected only appointive
planning commission decisions, the Washington Supreme Court soon
imposed similar criteria upon elective bodies. In Fleming v. City of
Tacoma,3 the court found the procedural differences between rezone
hearings before appointive and elective bodies were insignificant. An
inference of bias had arisen when a city councilman accepted em-
ployment with a successful rezone applicant shortly after the rezon-
ing decision. The Fleming court overturned the rezone although, as
in Buell, the councilman's vote was not necessary for passage. The
court held that regardless of actual facts, the inescapable inference in
the public mind was that the councilman arranged his employment
before the vote.32
Fleming represents both a logical extension of previous appearance
of fairness cases and a significant departure from the judiciary's long-
established rule against examining legislative motives.33 The Flem-
ing court distinguished between an elective zoning board's considera-
tion of a rezone and its initial adoption of a comprehensive plan or
zoning code.34 The court considered rezone proceedings quasi-judi-
cial in nature, while it termed adoption of a plan or zoning code a
legislative process insulated from substantial judicial review.35
member's personal interest in a matter being acted upon, be reasonably justified
in thinking that partiality may exist? If answered in the affirmative, such deliber-
ations, and any course of conduct reached thereon, should be voided.
Id at 361, 552 P.2d at 183.
In Swift, the court found that the chairman of the Board of County Commissioners
had not acted impartially. The chairman was also a stockholder and chairman of the
board of the mortgagee of the affected development. The court therefore invoked the
appearance of fairness doctrine to invalidate the commission decision, even though
the chairman had ceased to be a commission member before the final vote. The court
concluded that "it is the appearance [of fairness] however, that is determinative." Id
at 362, 552 P.2d at 184.
31. 81 Wash. 2d 292, 502 P.2d 327 (1972).
32. Id at 300, 502 P.2d at 332. See Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426
U.S. 668 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting). In Eastlake, Justice Stevens cited Fleming
with approval to support his position that the opportunity to apply for a zoning code
amendment is protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. A
zoning applicant deserves fair consideration during the proceedings. Id.
33. See 3 A. RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING ch. 52 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as RATHKOPF]. But see Byers v. Board of Clallam County
Comm'rs, 84 Wash. 2d 796, 529 P.2d 823 (1974) (court hinted in dicta that even the
legislative process of initial zoning, as distinguished from rezoning, may be subject to
an appearance of fairness attack). Id at 803, 529 P.2d at 829.
34. 81 Wash. 2d at 298, 502 P.2d at 330-31.
35. Id
[Vol. 20:75
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Further, Fleming refined the quasi-judicial/legislative distinctions.
The court identified three factors differentiating quasi-judicial rezone
actions from the legislative actions of a zoning board. First, rezones
are adjudicatory in nature; the decisionmaker must decide between
proponents and opponents. Second, a rezone has localized applica-
bility, usually affecting only the immediate area being rezoned. Fi-
nally, statutes, charters, or ordinances generally require mandatory
rezone hearings. Most legislative hearings, on the other hand, are
largely discretionary.36
Fleming, in effect, is the landmark case on the appearance of fair-
ness doctrine. It expressly rejects the legislative label for rezones. As
noted above, the court drew strong distinctions between legislative
and quasi-judicial zoning proceedings.37 These distinctions provide a
rationale for other jurisdictions to consider adopting an appearance
of fairness requirement. If other states recognize that rezones and
other individual-oriented land use procedures are different than gen-
eral zoning decisions, they will better protect all parties affected.
II. WHEN DOES THE DOCTRINE APPLY?
A. The Quasi-Judicial Consideration and Due Process Roots
Outside Washington, no other state has explicitly recognized the
appearance of fairness doctrine.38 Some state courts, however, have
implicitly used the doctrine through a growing concern over the
quasi-judicial nature of zoning proceedings.
Many state courts acknowledge that rezone hearings are basically
quasi-judicial and apply a test of judicial review similar to the ap-
pearance of fairness.39 The adjudicatory nature of rezone proceed-
ings entitles participants to certain due process protections, either
regarding the disinterestedness of the decisionmaker or the conduct
of the hearing itself. Nevertheless, absent a quasi-judicial characteri-
zation, most courts do not impose an appearance of fairness require-
ment; rather, they retain the traditional, more limited scope of
36. Id at 299, 502 P.2d at 331.
37. See note 35 and accompanying text supra.
38. While no state expressly has adopted this doctrine, at least one state, Califor-
nia, has required an appearance of impartiality in planning commission decisionmak-
ing. See Kimura v. Roberts, 89 Cal. App. 3d 871, 152 Cal. Rptr. 569 (1979).
39. See note 47 infra.
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40
review.
The United States Supreme Court recently considered the problem
of due process requirements for zoning proceedings. In Withrow v.
Larkin,4 the Court observed that a board's performance of both in-
vestigative and adjudicative functions is not a violation of due pro-
cess.4" Although the Constitution requires actual fairness in an
administrative adjudicatory tribunal, a board may base its proce-
dures upon "local realities., 43 The Court concluded that given the
necessity of implementing a conflict-resolving machinery, only when
the risk of unfairness becomes unacceptably high should a court in-
validate the adjudication.'
Significantly, the Court in Withrow also recognized in dicta that a
board must attend the administrative hearing with every element of
complete fairness. It indicated that under proper facts, a hearing may
be unconstitutional on unfairness grounds.45 The Supreme Court
and some state courts express concern not only for the participating
parties, but also in the maintenance of public confidence.46 Thus, the
Withrow due process concerns can be seen as a basis for an appear-
ance of fairness requirement.
40. For a representative, though not inclusive list of jurisdictions retaining the
traditional legislative approach, see Mueller v. City of Phoenix, 102 Ariz. 575, 435
P.2d 472 (1967); Ruppert v. City of Washington, 366 F. Supp. 686 (D.D.C. 1973); City
of Miami Beach v. Schauer, 104 So. 2d 129 (Fla. Ct. App. 1958), cert. discharged, 112
So. 2d 838 (Fla. 1958); Rutland Environ. Prot. Ass'n v. Kane County, 31 Ill. App. 3d
82, 334 N.E.2d 215 (1975); Bryant v. Lake County Trust Co., 334 N.E.2d 730 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1975); Puryear v. City of Greenville, 432 S.W.2d 437 (Ky. Ct. App. 1968); Crall
v. City of Leominister, 362 Mass. 95, 284 N.E.2d 610 (1972); Leavitt v. Incorporated
Village of Sand Point, 6 N.Y.2d 269, 160 N.E.2d 501, 189 N.Y.S.2d 212 (1959); Don-
nelly v. City of Fairview Park, 13 Ohio St. 2d 1, 233 N.E.2d 500 (1968); O'Rourke v.
City of Tulsa, 457 P.2d 782 (Okla. 1969). But see Jarrott v. Scrivener, 225 F. Supp.
827 (D.D.C. 1964) (granting a special exception to zoning ordinance subject to ap-
pearance of fairness doctrine); Fail v. La Porte County Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 355
N.E.2d 455 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976).
41. 421 U.S. 35 (1975).
42. Id at 58.
43. Id at 59.
44. Id at 57.
45. Id at 47.
46. Maintenance of public confidence in decisionmaking processes is a goal of
many courts in evaluating zoning decisions. See, e.g., Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35
(1975); Aldom v. Borough of Roseland, 42 N.J. Super. 495, 127 A.2d 190 (App. Div.
1956); Barbara Realty Co. v. Zoning Bd. of Rev., 85 R.I. 152, 128 A.2d 342 (1952);
Smith v. Skagit County, 75 Wash. 2d 715, 453 P.2d 832 (1969).
[Vol. 20:75
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A number of state courts recognize the quasi-judicial nature of
zoning proceedings, or at least a quasi-judicial aspect to such pro-
ceedings which requires an appearance of fairness. 47 Other state
courts have compromised, taking a position midway between the
quasi-judicial and traditional legislative views.48 These courts ac-
knowledge the necessity of procedural fairness while retaining the
legislative label.49
Although there is a trend toward characterizing rezoning proceed-
ings as quasi-judicial, most states still regard them as legislative.50 In
designating a proceeding legislative, a court will not reverse a deci-
sion unless it is clearly "arbitrary or capricious."'" Under this view,
courts have denied any imposition of strict procedural safeguards, in-
cluding the appearance of fairness doctrine.52 In those states which
reject the legislative label, however, the quasi-judicial characteriza-
tion can extend beyond rezoning proceedings. Amending a compre-
hensive plan, granting a variance or special exception, and approving
a conditional use permit can all be described as quasi-judicial, and
thus subject to an appearance of fairness requirement."
47. The following states recognize a quasi-judicial aspect to zoning proceedings,
requiring an appearance of fairness. See Snyder v. City of Lockwood, 189 Colo. 421,
542 P.2d 371 (1975) (dictum); Low v. Town of Madison, 135 Conn. 1, 60 A.2d 774
(1948); Brown v. District of Colum. Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 413 A.2d 1276 (D.C.
Ct. App. 1980); Acierno v. Folsom, 337 A.2d 309 (Del. 1975); Town v. Land Use
Comm'n, 55 Hawaii 538, 524 P.2d 84 (1974); West v. City of Portage, 392 Mich. 458,
221 N.W.2d 503 (1974); Aldom v. Borough of Roseland, 42 N.J. Super. 495, 127 A.2d
190 (App. Div. 1956); Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs, 264 Or. 574, 507 P.2d 23
(1973); Horn v. Township of Hilltown, 461 Pa. 745, 337 A.2d 858 (1978); Fleming v.
City of Tacoma, 81 Wash. 2d 292, 502 P.2d 327 (1972).
48. Three states have adopted an approach which incorporates or at least recog-
nizes aspects of both the quasi-judicial and legislative characterizations. See Olley
Valley Estates, Inc. v. Fussell, 232 Ga. 779, 208 S.E.2d 801 (1974); Ford v. Baltimore
County, 268 Md. 172, 300 A.2d 204 (1973); Golden Gate Corp. v. Town of Narragan-
sett, 116 R.I. 552, 359 A.2d 321 (1976).
49. See note 40 suprtz See generally Sullivan, Arabi Revisited- The Evolving Con-
cept of Procedural Due Process Before Land Use Regulato Bodies, 15 SANTA CLARA
LAW. 50 (1975); Note, Zoning Amendments-The Product of Judicial or Quasi-Judicial
Action, 33 OHIO ST. L.J. 130 (1972).
50. See generally I RATHKOPF, supra note 33, at ch. 4 (1980).
51. See note 40 and accompanying text supra.
52. E.g., Auckland v. Board of County Comm'rs, 536 P.2d 444 (Or. Ct. App.
1975).
53. In Chrobuck v. Snohomish County, 78 Wash. 2d 858, 480 P.2d 489 (1971), the
Washington Supreme Court defined its concept of a fair hearing:
Certainly, in its role as a hearing and fact-finding tribunal, the planning commis-
1980]
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Most courts base application of the appearance of fairness doctrine
on due process considerations fundamental to adjudicatory proceed-
ings. 4 The Washington Supreme Court, however, has noted that its
due process grounds for the appearance of fairness doctrine are not
constitutionally based. 5 Instead, the Washington court grounds the
doctrine's application on its own notion of what constitutes a truly
fair "hearing."56
B. Statutory Bases. Conflict of Interest Statutes or
Public Hearing Requirements
Some courts avoid common law due process problems by invali-
dating zoning decisions on statutory grounds. These statutes disqual-
ify a member of a body who has a particularly defined conflict of
interest.57 Other courts go beyond express statutory language to void
actions for the appearance of a conflict of interest. Additionally,
some courts extend this statutory disqualification to members of bod-
ies not named in the statute.5
8
Washington courts invoke the appearance of fairness doctrine in
land use matters only when a given statute requires a public hearing.
In that instance, the doctrine applies whether or not the decisionmak-
ing body is elective 59 or appointive. 6' The courts, however, will not
sion's function more nearly than not partakes of the nature of an administrative,
quasi-judicial proceeding, implicit in which is the basic due process requirement
that the hearing and fact-finding process must be fair and impartial.
id at 869, 480 P.2d at 495-96. Accord, Pizzola v. Planning and Zoning Comm'n, 167
Conn. 202, 355 A.2d 21 (1974).
54. E.g., Arnel Dev. Co. v. City of Costa Mesa, 98 Cal. App. 3d 567, 159 Cal.
Rptr. 592 (1979), reversed, 620 P.2d 569, 169 Cal. Rptr. 904 (1980); Fasano v. Board of
County Comm'rs, 264 Or. 574, 507 P.2d 23 (1973).
55. City of Bellevue v. King County, Boundary Rev. Bd., 90 Wash. 2d 856, 586
P.2d 470 (1978).
56. Id at 863, 586 P.2d at 475.
57. These statutes vary from state to state. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 8- 11, 8-21 (1980); N.J. STAT. ANN. 40:55-1.4 (West 1980); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN.
ch. 268A, §§ 19(a), 21(a) (Michie/Law. Co-op 1980); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. 31:73
(1979).
58. See, e.g., Aldom v. Borough of Roseland, 42 N.J. Super. 495, 127 A.2d 190
(App. Div. 1956) (entire borough council proceeding invalidated although interested
member's vote not needed for passage and conflict statute applied only to planning
board members). Accord, Lage v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 148 Conn. 597, 172 A.2d
911 (1961); Fail v. La Porte County Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 355 N.E.2d 455 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1976) (dictum).
59. E.g., Fleming v. City of Tacoma, 81 Wash. 2d 292, 502 P.2d 327 (1972).
60. E.g., Buell v. City of Bremerton, 80 Wash. 2d 518, 495 P.2d 1358 (1972).
[Vol. 20:75
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apply the doctrine to discretionary administrative actions which do
not require a prior public hearing.6
Not all states draw the same distinction. For example, in New
Jersey, the public hearing requirement is not dispositive with regard
to the imposition of an appearance of fairness standard.62 In general,
courts must examine the statutory requirements to determine whether
either a conflict of interest statute or a public hearing requirement
supplies a basis for application of an appearance of fairness doctrine.
C. Other Administrative Procedures
The appearance of fairness doctrine, though originating in the ju-
dicial review of rezoning actions, has spread to other zoning and non-
zoning matters. Courts in Washington have applied the doctrine to
adjudications as disparate as permit applications to install gasoline
storage tanks on residential property, 3 hearings before the State
Human Rights Commission on a landlord's refusal to rent an apart-
ment," and municipal takeover of a water district.65 In other states,
courts have applied some form of an appearance of fairness doctrine
in disbarment proceedings66 and civil service commission hearings on
a policeman's appeal of his suspension.67 Imaginative practitioners
may thus employ the appearance of fairness doctrine in a wide range
of factual situations.
III. WHAT APPEARS UNFAIR?
The apparent unfairness which has compelled courts to overturn
the actions of municipal decisionmaking bodies may relate either to
61. See, e.g., Polygon Corp. v. City of Seattle, 90 Wash. 2d 59, 579 P.2d 1309
(1978) (denial of building permit not impeachable on grounds of appearance of fair-
ness violation because Uniform Building Code does not require a public hearing).
62. See Wilson v. City of Long Beach, 27 N.J. 360, 142 A.2d 837 (1958) (state
supreme court ruled that legislative hearing held under blighted areas statute was not
subject to full due process requirements and the full reach of statutory disqualification
for personal interest). See also Acierno v. Folsom, 337 A.2d 309 (Del. 1975).
63. Fleck v. King County, 16 Wash. App. 668, 558 P.2d 254 (1977).
64. Loveland v. Leslie, 21 Wash. App. 84, 583 P.2d 664 (1978).
65. King County Water Dist. v. King County Boundary Rev. Bd., 87 Wash. 2d
536, 554 P.2d 1060 (1976).
66. Eg., In re Heirich, 10 Ill. 2d 357, 140 N.E.2d 825 (1957); In re Schlesinger,
404 Pa. 584, 172 A.2d 835 (1961).
67. Gardner v. Repasky, 434 Pa. 126, 252 A.2d 704 (1969).
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potential bias or interest on the part of the decisionmaker, or to im-
propriety in the way a hearing was conducted or a decision reached.68
A. Potential Bias or Interest of Decisionmaker
Stringent standards have evolved in Washington governing the im-
partiality of members of a decisionmaking body. The state courts
have indicated that the motives of decisionmakers should be beyond
reproach. Thus, they have invalidated rezones upon findings of un-
fairness in fact, through a bias rationale.
In Chrobuck v. Snohomish County,69 the Washington Supreme
Court invalidated a rezone, in part because the applicant improperly
lobbied for and obtained a planning commission member's public
support for a proposed refinery.7" The court also noted that another
commission member had signed a newspaper advertisement and ap-
peared as a witness in favor of the refinery.71 These are examples of
prejudgment of the issue before the commission.
Similarly, prejudgment was a factor in the court's remand of a re-
zone in Anderson v. Island County.72 In Anderson, the chairman of
the board of county commissioners moved to grant the rezone before
presentation of the opposing testimony was complete. At the hearing,
he persisted in trying to bypass the opposition, telling them they were
"just wasting [their] time" by testifying.73
68. The test is perhaps best summarized in a recent Washington case: There is an
appearance of fairness violation when "a disinterested person, having been appraised
of the totality of a board member's personal interest in a matter being acted upon,
[would] be reasonably justified in thinking that partiality may exist." Swift v. Island
County, 87 Wash. 2d 348, 361, 552 P.2d 175, 183 (1976).
69. 78 Wash. 2d 858, 480 P.2d 489 (1971).
70. Id at 868, 480 P.2d at 495.
71. Id at 865-67, 480 P.2d at 494. Whether the advertisement was signed before
or after the commissioner's appointment was not made clear in the record.
For a contrary view to the court's holding in Chrobuck, see the dissenting opinion
of Neil, J., who felt that signing the advertisement and appearing as a witness were
insufficient to overturn the commission's decision. 78 Wash. 2d at 881-82, 480 P.2d at
503. Justice Neill, however, later acquiesced in the majority's view. See Fleming v.
City of Tacoma, 81 Wash. 2d 292, 502 P.2d 327 (1972).
72. 81 Wash. 2d 312, 501 P.2d 594 (1972).
73. Id at 326, 501 P.2d at 602. Accord, Barbara Realty Co. v. Zoning Bd. of Rev.,
85 R.I. 152, 128 A.2d 342 (1957) (board of review member's pre-hearing statements,
indicating he favored the proposed rezone, showed sufficient prejudgment to overturn
the board's decision). But see Zimarino v. Zoning Bd. of Rev., 610 R.I. 383, 187 A.2d
259 (1963) (remarks "suggestive of some impatience or petulance" on a member's
part, do not rise to the level of creating a "reasonable inference of prejudice").
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Another source of potential bias noted in Chrobuck, and a com-
mon thread in many cases, is partiality resulting from previous busi-
ness dealings. In Chrobuck, for example, one of the planning
commissioners had represented the petitioner in legal matters ten
years earlier. 4
Perhaps the most common reason for judicial intervention in ap-
pearance of fairness cases is that a member of the decisionmaking
tribunal has a direct or indirect interest in the outcome whereby he or
she stands to gain or lose. In Buell v. City of Bremerton 75 the chair-
man of the planning commission owned commercial property near an
area which was under consideration for a rezone to commercial use.
The court found his potential benefit from the rezone sufficient to
trigger the appearance of fairness doctrine.7 6
The Washington Supreme Court is sensitive to even the slightest
appearance of unfairness in rezone matters. Narrowsview Preserva-
tion Association v. City of Tacoma7 7 evidences this sensitivity by strik-
ing down a rezone because of a hint of pecuniary interest. In
Narrowsview, a bank employing a planning commissioner was the
mortgagee of rezoned property which had more than doubled in
value after the rezone. At the time of rezoning, the mortgage was
overdue and the property owner close to bankruptcy. Although the
planning commissioner was a minor loan officer at the bank with
only minimal knowledge of the property owner's business with it, the
court held that it appeared unfair to have a bank employee partici-
pating in a decision which would greatly increase the value of the
bank's collateral.7" The court did not require actual bias, but merely
74. 78 Wash. 2d at 866, 480 P.2d at 494. Similarly, in Anderson v. Island County,
81 Wash. 2d 312, 326, 501 P.2d 594, 602 (1972). The chairman of the board of com-
missioners was the former owner of the applicant ompany. See also note 30 and
accompanying text supra.
75. 80 Wash. 2d 518, 495 P.2d 1358 (1972).
76. Id at 525,495 P.2d at 1361-62. Compare Buell with Byers v. Board of Clallam
County Comm'rs, 84 Wash. 2d 796, 529 P.2d 823 (1974). The court in Byers observed
that even if the appearance of fairness doctrine applied to an initial, as contrasted
with an amendatory, zoning of property, there was no violation where members of a
planning commission owned property ten and fifteen miles away from the zoned area,
and received no benefit from the zoning.
77. 84 Wash. 2d 416, 526 P.2d 897 (1974).
78. Id at 420-21, 526 P.2d at 900-01. But see Anderson v. Zoning Comm'n, 157
Conn. 285, 253 A.2d 16 (1968) (no violation of Connecticut conflict statute where
resigning chairman nominated a commission alternate from his own company, since
chairman had no interest in the outcome, but merely recommended the alternate's
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the suggestion of unfairness, to trigger the doctrine.
Not only does pecuniary interest demonstrate bias, but associa-
tional ties do, as well. In SAVE v. City of Bothell,79 a violation of the
appearance of fairness occurred in connection with a planning com-
mission's affirmative recommendation to rezone a large parcel for a
regional shopping center. Two of the city's planning commissioners
had ties with the local chamber of commerce, one as a member of its
board of directors, the other as its paid executive director. Because
members of the chamber stood to benefit from the proposed shopping
center, the court struck down the rezone. It contended there were
enough "entangling influences" to raise the appearance of partiality,
regardless of its actual existence.80
The court in SAVE rejected arguments that finding associational
ties in violation of the appearance of fairness doctrine would unduly
hamper membership in community and civic organizations such as
the chamber of commerce. Although recognizing that the first
amendment protects membership in a community organization, the
court ruled that protecting the appearance of fairness would not bur-
den the right of association."' Such a rule does not prohibit member-
ship; rather, it limits participation in proceedings "when such
participation demonstrates the existence of an interest which might
substantially influence the individual's judgment." 2 Does this anal-
ysis beg the question of whether such a holding will have a "chilling"
effect?
name; no violation where another commission member was vice-president of a com-
pany represented by the law firm handling the application for a rezone); Wilson v.
City of Long Branch, 27 N.J. 360, 142 A.2d 837 (1958) (no violation of state conflict
statute where chairman of planning board was president of bank holding mortgages
in area under consideration; interest too remote and contingent).
79. 89 Wash. 2d 862, 576 P.2d 401 (1978).
80. Id at 873, 576 P.2d at 407. But see King City Water Dist. v. King County
Boundary Rev. Bd., 87 Wash. 2d 536, 554 P.2d 1060 (1976). In King, the City of Des
Moines took over a water district. The county boundary review board upheld the
action, despite a complaint that a board member breached the appearance of fairness
doctrine by conversing with persons associated with certain water systems. The rec-
ord contained no reference either to the content of the conversations or the conversa-
tions themselves, nor was there a suggestion of an interest which might benefit by the
city's takeover. Since there was no more than a "mere acquaintance with, or casual
business dealing in a minimal sense" with the outsiders, the court held that no viola-
tion occurred. 87 Wash. 2d at 542, 554 P.2d at 1064, citing Narrowsview Preservation
Ass'n v. City of Tacoma, 84 Wash. 2d 416, 526 P.2d 897 (1974).
81. 89 Wash. 2d at 874, 576 P.2d at 407-08.
82. Id
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These judicially-created standards in Washington for disqualifica-
tion of a decisionmaker on the ground of possible bias are stringent
but indefinite. One would expect to find more definite standards in
states with conflict of interest statutes which prohibit persons with
certain enumerated personal or financial interests from participating
in particular proceedings.8 3
Connecticut, for example, has a well-developed body of case law
interpreting a statutory conflict of interest provision.84 The legisla-
ture enacted the law following the state supreme court's decision in
Low v. Town of Madison .85 In Low, the court overturned a rezone to
business of a residential area because a member of the zoning com-
mission was the applicant's spouse.8 6 A subsequent decision inter-
preted the statute, in light of Low, as applying to an interested zoning
commissioner who participated in deliberations, but did not vote on
rezone applications. 87 More recently, the statute has served to invali-
date zoning commission proceedings in which a potentially interested
commissioner, or one having at least a clearly preconceived opinion,
participated in hearings and deliberations.88 The court has extended
83. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-11 (1980); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-23(b)
(West 1980).
84. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-11 (1980) provides in part: "No member of any zoning
commission or board and no member or any zoning board of appeals shall participate
in the hearing or decision of the board or commission of which he is a member upon
any matter in which he is directly or indirectly interested in a personal or financial
sense."
85. 135 Conn. 1, 60 A.2d 774 (1948).
86. Id at 10, 60 A.2d at 777-78. Even in 1948, the court anticipated a doctrine
based upon apparent improprieties: "Anything which tends to weaken [public] confi-
dence and to undermine the sense of security for individual rights which the citizen is
entitled to feel is against public policy." Id at 9, 60 A.2d at 778.
87. Mills v. Town Plan and Zoning Comm'n, 144 Conn. 493, 134 A.2d 250 (1957).
88. See, e.g., Kovalik v. Planning and Zoning Comm'n, 155 Conn. 497, 234 A.2d
838 (1967) (commission chairman owned about 8% of the rezoned land); Lake Garda
Improvement Ass'n v. Town Plan and Zoning Comm'n, 151 Conn. 476, 199 A.2d 162
(1964) (commission member demonstrated longstanding opposition to appellants and
friendship with rival improvement group seeking the rezone); Daly v. Town Plan and
Zoning Comm'n, 150 Conn. 495, 191 A.2d 250 (1963) (commission member was of-
ficer of association which contracted to sell land to broadcasting company if condition
precedent of a rezone was satisfied); Lage v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 148 Conn. 597,
172 A.2d 911 (1961) (zoning commission member had preconceived notion about the
desirability of a rezone). But see Schwartz v. Town of Hamden, 168 Conn. 8, 357
A.2d 488 (1975) (although commission member was in law practice with town attor-
ney, court found no unlawful behavior because neither the member nor the town
attorney took part in proceedings; thus, no interest could be inferred).
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this rationale to apply to members of both a planning board 9 and a
city council.90
New Jersey cases invalidating zoning proceedings on grounds of
apparent bias rely in part upon a statute providing that no member of
a planning board may act on any matter in which he or she has a
direct or indirect personal or financial interest.91 In Zell v. Borough
of Roseland,92 two members of the planning board belonged to a
church which sought to sell property to a bank, conditioning the
transfer upon obtaining a rezone from the planning commission and
borough council. The court held that a disqualifying interest existed,
even though the ,two members did not individually stand to benefit in
any way which would violate the apparent intent of the statute.93
Many New Jersey cases do not rely on the statute. 41dom v. Bor-
ough ofRoseland,94 for example, involved a borough council member
who had worked for twenty-three years for the company requesting a
rezone. No statute required his disqualification, but the court ex-
panded the common law doctrine of disqualification for pecuniary
interest to void the entire proceeding. The court ruled the disqualify-
ing interest need not be pecuniary; it need only be a private interest
different from that held in common with the public.95 The court ad-
ded that the standard for disqualification should be the same either at
89. Josephson v. Planning Bd., 151 Conn. 489, 199 A.2d 690 (1964). But see
Dana-Robin Corp. v. Common Council of Danbury, 166 Conn. 207, 348 A.2d 560
(1974) (finding no disqualification regarding planning commission member who, al-
though an owner of family corporation stock in the affected property, voted on advi-
sory report for zoning approval).
90. R.K. Dev. v. City of Norwalk, 156 Conn. 369, 242 A.2d 781 (1968) (treating
common council as an administrative body for purposes of deciding propriety of ac-
tions, court held that council member who had interest in property adjoining appli-
cant's, and who openly opposed application, was disqualified).
91. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-23(b) (West 1980).
92. 42 N.J. Super. 75, 125 A.2d 890 (App. Div. 1956).
93. Id at 81-82, 125 A.2d at 893-94. Compare Zell with the cases decided under
Connecticut's conflict provision, discussed in notes 84-90 and accompanying text
supra See also Ferguson v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 29 Conn. Supp. 31, 269 A.2d 857
(Com. P1. 1970) (chairman of zoning commission held, under Connecticut statute, as
unlawfully representing opponents of a variance by his personal contacts and associa-
tion with them).
94. 42 N.J. Super. 495, 127 A.2d 190 (App. Div. 1956).
95. Id at 507, 127 A.2d at 196. Accord, Helmsley v. Borough of Fort Lee, 78 N.J.
200, 394 A.2d 65 (1978). The court in 4ldom added that it would not examine the
degree of personal interest involved, since any "private interest," once so categorized,
would be sufficient to disqualify. 42 N.J. Super. at 502, 127 A.2d at 194.
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common law or under a conflict of interest statute. The standard
should not be whether the decisionmaker is in fact influenced by per-
sonal interest, but whether any suspicion of a conscious or unconscious
influence on his integrity might result. 96
An interesting twist in the New Jersey cases is Wollen v. Borough of
Fort Lee,97 wherein the state supreme court upheld a rezone even
though three legislators, who had made campaign promises to ap-
prove it, cast votes essential to its passage. The court distinguished
between comment on issues involved in the legislators' "sworn legis-
lative duty" and the self-interest disapproved in Aldom.98 The Wol-
len court established a standard for invalidation based upon whether
the councilmen's minds were open to conviction in the just fulfillment
of their "solemn obligation to the community." 99
Other states have statutory conflict of interest provisions which can
invalidate proceedings that tend to weaken public confidence in the
zoning process, even though the plaintiff cannot show actual partial-
ity."°° Courts interpreting some state statutes, however, have found
they prohibit only interests which have either "substantially influ-
enced" a decision,' 0 ' or clearly produced bias, not merely its appear-
ance. 1
0 2
96. 42 N.J. Super. at 502, 127 A.2d at 194. Another case decided before Aidom
states the reason for adopting such an approach: "The concurrence of an interested
member in the action taken by the body taints it with illegality." Piggott v. Borough
of Hopewell, 22 N.J. Super. 106, 91 A.2d 667 (App. Div. 1952).
97. 27 N.J. 408, 142 A.2d 881 (1958).
98. Id at 421, 142 A.2d at 888-89.
99. Id Accord, City of Fairfield v. Superior Ct., 44 CA 3d 768, 537 P.2d 375, 122
Cal. Rptr. 543 (1976); Fiser v. City of Knoxville, 584 S.W.2d 659 (Tenn. App. 1979)
(both cases recognize right and responsibility of elected officials to express views on
important issues). But see notes 18-21 and accompanying text supra.
100. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 18-7-5-1 (1971). In Fail v. La Porte County Bd. of
Zoning Appeals, 355 N.E.2d 455 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976), the court ruled that a finding of
conflict under this statutory provision may be based wholly upon the fact that circum-
stances tend to weaken public confidence.
101. See Crall v. City of Leominister, 284 N.E.2d 610 (Mass. 1972) (acknowledg-
ing "substantially influenced" language of MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 268A, § 21(a)
(Michie/Law Co-op 1980), but withholding decision on basis of that provision).
102. See Sherman v. Town of Brentwood, 112 N.H. 122, 290 A.2d 47 (1972) (al-
though member of zoning board of adjustment worked in county surplus food pro-
gram, decision to grant variance for county hospital addition was not unfair). See
generally Annot., 10 A.L.R.3d 694 (1966) (concerning disqualification for bias or in-
terest of officers participating in zoning proceedings).
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B. Conduct of Hearing
Courts may also invalidate municipal zoning decisions because of
improperly conducted hearings. Washington courts have ruled that
all interested parties at a public hearing for a rezone deserve fair con-
sideration. Both Smith v. Skagit County1"3 and Chrobuck v. Snohom-
ish County' involved irregularities in the conduct of public hearings
on rezones. In Chrobuck, although the planning commissioners' pos-
sible bias was the controlling factor, the court also considered the
denial of cross-examination at the hearing as significant.' 0 5 Simi-
larly, in Pizzola v. Planning and Zoning Commission,1 6 an invalida-
tion resulted because the zoning commission considered traffic
studies submitted by the applicant's expert in a closed executive ses-
sion, denying opponents an opportunity to inspect the studies, cross-
examine the expert, or present rebuttal. 7
Courts in other states have reached similar results. In Pendley v.
Lake Harbin Civic Association, 108 the Georgia Supreme Court effec-
tively ruled that a public hearing means an opportunity to be heard.
The court upheld the granting of an injunctionpendente lite in a suit
to overturn a rezone.'0 9 While over one thousand people stood
outside, the city held a public hearing on the rezone in a small room
accommodating fifty people. The court observed that the rezone
would be void if plaintiffs could prove at trial that the lack of suffi-
103. 75 Wash. 2d 715, 453 P.2d 832 (1969).
104. 78 Wash. 2d 858, 480 P.2d 489 (1971).
105. Id at 870, 480 P.2d at 496. The court did not recognize a comprehensive
right to cross-examine in zoning hearings; rather, under the facts the court found the
proceeding was particularly adversary, as both sides employed counsel and experts,
leading to the conclusion that denial of cross-examination undermined the appear-
ance of fairness. Id
106. 167 Conn. 202, 355 A.2d 21 (1974).
107. Id at 207, 355 A.2d at 24-25. The court acknowledged that zoning proceed-
ings do not follow strict evidentiary rules, but stated that due process requires the
opportunity to cross-examine and rebut. Id Cf. Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Board
of Aldermen, 284 N.C. 458, 202 S.E.2d 129 (1974) (zoning board of adjustment or
board of aldermen holding quasi-judicial hearing must retain essential elements of
fair trial); Wasicki v. Zoning Bd., 163 Conn. 166, 302 A.2d 276 (1972) (at executive
session, zoning board allowed parties interested in passing of amendment to explain
statements opposing homeowners made at public hearing, but board did not give
homeowners chance to cross-examine or rebut). See generally 3 RATHKOPF, supra
note 33, at § 37:85-93.
108. 230 Ga. 631, 198 S.E.2d 503 (1973).
109. Id at 635, 198 S.E.2d at 507.
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cient space deprived a party materially affected of the opportunity to
be heard, provided that the party's views did not merely overlap
those actually presented."'
A "Catch-22" public hearing led the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
to reverse denial of a rezoning variance for a quarry in Horn v. Town-
ship ofHiltown.III The township's representative at the public hear-
ing not only conducted it, but also ruled on evidence and objections,
including his own. Though there was no factual showing of harm to
the applicant, the court prohibited this procedure since it gave the
proceedings an appearance of possible prejudice." 2
C. Time of Impropriety
The appearance of entangling interests or bias developing prior to
a zoning hearing may cause invalidation of a rezoning decision on
appearance of fairness grounds." 3 Less obvious is the willingness of
some courts to invalidate actions where subsequent interests or biases
emerge, usually on a "relation-back" theory.
In Fleming v. City of Tacoma," 4 the city council's determination to
enact a zoning change was made without question of impropriety.
Within forty-eight hours of the decision, however, developers of the
property at issue retained one of the councilmen as their attorney.
The court assumed the arrangement predated the council vote; thus
the entangling interests "related back" to impeach the official pro-
ceeding."15
110. id at 637, 198 S.E.2d at 507. But see Miner v. Yonkers, 19 Misc. 2d 321, 189
N.Y.S.2d 762 (Sup. Ct. 1959), afI'd, 9 App. Div. 2d 907, 195 N.Y.S.2d 242 (1959)
(inadequately-sized hearing room, leading to overflow crowd, not ground for invali-
dating zoning action).
111. 461 Pa. 745, 337 A.2d 858 (1975).
112. Id at -, 337 A.2d at 859-60. The language the court relied on was espe-
cially relevant: "Any tribunal permitted by law to try cases and controversies must
not only be unbiased but must avoid even the appearance of bias." Commonwealth
Coatings Corp. v. Continental Cas., 393 U.S. 145, 150 (1968). Seegeneraly I ANDER-
sON, rupra note 1, at § 4.16.
113. See notes 69-78 and accompanying text supra.
114. 81 Wash. 2d 292, 502 P.2d 327 (1972).
115. Id at 300, 502 P.2d at 331-32. Although the councilman voled in favor of
the change, his vote was not necessary for passage. Nevertheless, the court held that
the appearance of unfairness rendered the amendment invalid. Accord, Chicago,
Milw., St. P. & P.R.R. Co. v. State Human Rights Comm'n, 87 Wash. 2d 802, 557
P.2d 307 (1976) (decision of tribunal appointed by human rights commission to hear
discrimination case was tainted by membership on tribunal of person whose applica-
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D. Is the Violation Curable?
There is a fair degree of unanimity among the cases that an ap-
pearance of unfairness by one board member infects the entire
board's decision, and that merely disregarding the apparently unfair
vote will not cure the defect. The courts vary, however, on whether a
municipality may cure an appearance of fairness violation by holding
a subsequent fair hearing before another board or council.
In Buell v. City of Bremerton,"6 the Washington Supreme Court
voided a rezone adopted by the city council because the chairman of
the planning commission recommending the change stood to benefit
from it. In invalidating the entire proceeding, the court rejected the
argument that the commission would have made the same recom-
mendation even without the chairman's vote. The recommendation
of the commission could have impacted -both the council and the
public regardless of the actual situation." 7 Two dissenting justices
argued that independent review by the city council cured any appar-
ent unfairness in the previous commission proceedings." 8 The court
subsequently followed Buell in both Narrowsview Preservation Associ-
ation v. City of Tacoma 19 and SAVE v. City of Bothell.'2 ° In each
case, the court invalidated a rezoning decision made by a city council
acting on a tainted recommendation of the planning commission.' 2'
In other jurisdictions, courts have struck down rezone decisions on
similar grounds. The Connecticut Supreme Court invalidated a re-
zone in Daly v. Town Plan and Zoning Commission, 22 though a bi-
ased commissioner's vote was unnecessary for its passage. An
improper vote by one member, the court said, invalidates the votes of
all.' 23
tion for employment with the commission was pending, and who was employed by
commission within a month after tribunal reached a decision). But see Bell v. City of
Corvallis, 25 Or. App. 821, 551 P.2d 125 (1976) (limiting examination of any apparent
unfairness to acts done during decisionmaking process rather than after).
116. 80 Wash. 2d 518, 495 P.2d 1358 (1972).
117. Id at 525, 495 P.2d at 1362-63.
118. Id at 527-30, 495 P.2d at 1363-65.
119. 84 Wash. 2d 416, 526 P.2d 897 (1974).
120. 89 Wash. 2d 862, 576 P.2d 401 (1978).
121. Neither decision overtly addresses the issue of whether independent review
may negate the effects of tainted proceedings.
122. 150 Conn. 495, 191 A.2d 250 (1963).
123. Id at 500, 191 A.2d at 252. The court, however, did not discuss the curative
or noncurative effects of subsequent action. See also Mills v. Town Plan and Zoning
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New Jersey courts have been similarly strict in nullifying entire
proceedings upon a fairness violation, rather than looking for cura-
tive circumstances. In Hochberg v. Borough of Freehold,2 4 the New
Jersey court held the self-interest of one planning board member suf-
ficient to infect the entire board's vote on a rezone. Finding that later
approval by the borough council did not cure the defect in the earlier
proceedings, the court declared the ordinance at issue void. 25 Simi-
larly, in Aldom v. Borough ofRoseland,126 a borough council member
who had long worked for the company requesting the rezone refused
to disqualify himself, voting in favor of the change. That his vote
was unnecessary for passage would not cure the defect; the taint af-
fected all the members.
27
Since Aldom, New Jersey courts have expanded their impartiality
requirement to encompass situations where a councilman initially
votes to consider a change which would benefit him in a non-pecuni-
ary way but abstains from the final council vote approving the meas-
ure. In Netluch v. Mayor and Council of Borough of West Paterson,28
the court held that such a tainted vote, even for initial consideration
of the ordinance, infected its actual passage and rendered the rezone
void.' 29 Thus, as in Washington, New Jersey courts recognize that
some form of an appearance of unfairness will incurably taint zoning
decisions.
It is evident, then, that the appearance of fairness doctrine can
have dramatic effects in certain states. A single episode of questiona-
ble conduct at an initial hearing may void all later proceedings. Yet
this is not the invariable result. Though a number of state courts
have refused to hold that a later de novo hearing can cure prior ap-
pearance of fairness defects, some cases hold that procedural due
process defects may be cured by later hearings 3 ° or other means.13 1
Comm'n, 144 Conn. 493, 134 A.2d 250 (1957) (holding commission action invalidated
by member acting as strawman for purchase of property near rezone site).
124. 40 N.J. Super. 276, 123 A.2d 46 (App. Div. 1956).
125. Id at 283, 123 A.2d at 49. Hochberg was cited favorably in Buell v. City of
Bremerton, 80 Wash. 2d 518, 495 P.2d 1358 (1972). See notes 26-30 and accompany-
ing text supra.
126. 42 N.J. Super. 495, 127 A.2d 190 (App. Div. 1956).
127. Id at 507-08, 127 A.2d at 197.
128. 130 N.J. Super. 104, 325 A.2d 517 (Law Div. 1974).
129. ld at 109, 325 A.2d at 519-20. The court proceeded on a causation theory;
that is, if not for the introduction, the ordinance could not have passed.
130. See Nees v. SEC, 414 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1969) (reopening earlier proceeding,
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IV. THE JUDICIAL ROLE ON REVIEW
A. Review Only on the Record or Accept New Evidence
Concerning Improprieties?
Often a potential bias or interest will be unknown to parties in a
land use decision until after an unfavorable outcome has triggered a
lawsuit. The question then arises whether a reviewing court should
consider other evidence not in the record. There is no single answer.
Some jurisdictions, including Washington, admit evidence outside
the record where the appearance of fairness is at issue; otherwise, a
litigant could not prove the violation. 32 A trial court may receive
evidence of alleged unfairness to supplement the record in a certio-
rari proceeding.' 33 Washington courts permit the use of interrogato-
ries to uncover apparent unfairness, but are sensitive to their misuse
for "fishing expeditions."' 34 The courts will, however, draw some
limits on supplementing the record. If a litigant knows of an appear-
ance of fairness violation during the administrative hearing, he must
raise a timely objection, or he will have waived the opportunity to
rather than retrying case, was sufficient to satisfy due process where securities sales-
man who did not appear at first proceeding had opportunity to review earlier testi-
mony and cross-examine previous witnesses); Gerend v. Railroad Retirement Bd.,
248 F.2d 357 (9th Cir. 1957) (no unfair hearing where board kept petitioner informed
of proceedings and allowed him to submit any evidence and arguments); Bistrick v.
University of S.C., 324 F. Supp. 942 (D. S.C. 1971) (student afforded due process
when given opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, examine written statements, and
present evidence at de novo hearing following finding of guilty by special university
committee); Zanders v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 F. Supp. 747 (W.D. La.
1968) (full de novo evidentiary hearing in front of board of education afforded stu-
dents due process after college had attempted to expel them).
131. See Jarrott v. Scrivener, 225 F. Supp. 827 (D. D.C. 1964) (where there is a
question as to integrity of zoning board's decision, court may go outside board's rec-
ord and receive independent evidence); Lage v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 148 Conn.
597, 172 A.2d 911 (1961) (admitting evidence of witness who had not previously testi-
fied to establish aggrievement at prior hearing); Fail v. La Potre County Bd. of Zon-
ing Appeals, 355 N.E.2d 455 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976) (external evidence is admissible to
support or challenge findings of county zoning board's decision). But see Abraham-
son v. Wendell, 72 Mich. App. 80, 249 N.W.2d 302 (1976) (holding trial court re-
stricted to a de novo review on the record and precluded from going outside it).
132. See, e.g., City of Bellevue v. King County Boundary Rev. Bd., 90 Wash. 2d
856, 586 P.2d 470 (1978).
133. Id at 861, 586 P.2d at 475.
134. Id
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supplement the record by raising it later.' 35
B. Remedies
The typical remedy for an appearance of fairness violation is inval-
idation of the challenged zoning decision.'3 6 Additionally, some
courts, after detailing proper procedures and indicating which board
members should be disqualified,' 37 will remand the matter to the of-
fending decisionmaking body for reconsideration. 38 In light of these
remedies, plaintiffs seeking to halt development find the appearance
of fairness doctrine particularly attractive.
Courts may fashion more drastic remedies. In Jarrott v. Scriv-
ener,139 after finding a local board of zoning adjustment subject to
potentially improper influence, the court ordered creation of an en-
tirely new board to rehear the matter.140 Another remedy is disre-
gard of the tainted vote. The Supreme Court of Delaware adopted
this remedy in Acierno v. Folsom,' 4' overturning a planning depart-
ment's disapproval of subdivision plans. The court discounted the
vote of a city councilman who was also a planning board member
with an outspoken and hostile antagonism against the subdivision
plans. Despite this willingness of courts to fashion special remedies
under favorable circumstances, remand to the decisionmaker is the
common approach.
V. FUTURE OF THE DOCTRINE
A. Potentialfor Growth
As judges and attorneys recognize that rezoning and other land use
decisions take place in adjudicatory settings, procedural safeguards
such as the appearance of fairness doctrine may emerge in other ju-
risdictions. A number of state courts, including many which apply
the "legislative" label to rezoning, have already held that zoning
135. Eg., Narrowsview Preservation Ass'n v. City of Tacoma, 84 Wash. 2d 416,
526 P.2d 897 (1974).
136. See, e.g., Josephson v. Planning Bd., 151 Conn. 489, 199 A.2d 690 (1964).
137. See notes 128-29 and accompanying text infra.
138. Eg., Deal Garden, Inc. v. Board of Trustees, 48 N.J. 492, 226 A.2d 607
(1967); Hallenborg v. Town Clerk, 360 Mass. 513, 215 N.E.2d 525 (1971).
139. 225 F. Supp. 827 (D. D.C. 1964).
140. Id at 836.
141. 337 A.2d 309 (Del. 1975).
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amendments are not legislative acts subject to initiative or referen-
dum. 4 z Many of these states have either implicitly or explicitly ac-
knowledged the quasi-judicial nature of rezoning procedures.14
Other states, while viewing variances as quasi-judicial, still consider
zoning amendments as legislative. These states can easily recognize
the underlying similarity of the two processes and therefore may be-
gin to apply stricter procedural standards to rezoning decisions.
Conflict of interest statutes provide another basis for development
of the doctrine. As courts view an increasing number of situations as
potentially detrimental to fair, disinterested decisionmaking, the
pressure for closer judicial scrutiny of casual zoning proceedings will
increase." An example is the recent California decision regarding
campaign contributions by an applicant for subdivision approval and
the influence of such contributions on the decisionmakers' impartial-
ity. 1
45
B. Potential Limitations
Washington courts have limited the application of the appearance
of fairness doctrine to administrative or quasi-judicial actions. Al-
though there have been suggestions of extending its application, the
doctrine does not apply to the procedure for issuing building per-
mits' 4 6 or to administrative actions in connection with eminent do-
142. Id at 316.
143. See, e.g., Andover Dev. Corp. v. City of New Smyrna Beach, 328 So. 2d 231
(Fla. Ct. App. 1976) (zoning ordinances enacted through initiative and referendum do
not have the effect of accomplishing a rezoning); West v. City of Portage, 392 Mich.
458, 221 N.W.2d 303 (1974) (amendments to zoning ordinances changing the zoning
of particular property are not subject to referendum vote); Forman v. Eagle Thrifty
Drugs and Markets, Inc., 89 Nev. 533, 516 P.2d 1234 (1973) (once zoning has been
determined, changing the classification of an area is not subject to referendum); Leo-
nard v. City of Bothell, 87 Wash. 2d 847, 557 P.2d 1306 (1976) (ordinances are not
legislative policy decisions and thus are not subject to referendum elections). But see
City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668 (1976) (upholding city
ordinance requiring referendum for rezones). See generally Note, The Proper Use of
Referendum in Rezoning, 29 STAN. L. REV. 819 (1977).
144. See note 47 supra.
145. See Peterson and McCarthy, Small-Tract Rezonings: Toward Expanded Pro-
cedural Safeguards, 31 LAND UsE L. AND ZONING DIG. No. 4 (April 1979), at 3.
146. Woodlawn Hills Residents v. City Council, 90 Cal. App. 3d 678, 694-95, 153
Cal. Rptr. 651, 659 (1979), rev'd, 609 P.2d 1029, 164 Cal. Rptr.'255 (1980). Although
the California Court of Appeals expressly adopted the appearance of fairness doc-
trine, the state supreme court reversed the decision as to political contributions on first
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main proceedings. 147 Additionally, there are procedural limitations
within the doctrine itself. A party to a quasi-judicial proceeding
waives an appearance of fairness claim if he or she knows at the time
of the hearing that an apparent entangling interest, bias or other ir-
regularity exists, but fails to request disqualification of the affected
board member.' 48
Other states considering the appearance of fairness doctrine may
embrace it less fervently than Washington. Some may demand a
higher threshold of forbidden contacts or possible unfairness before
invalidating a proceeding. Still, courts in these states have become
more conscious of the necessity for an appearance of fairness in
quasi-judicial proceedings. Thus, other states may well impose simi-
lar limitations.' 49
VI. CONCLUSION
In Washington, as in other states employing concepts analogous to
the appearance of fairness doctrine, attorneys now approach land use
matters differently from the free and easy days of the old zoning
board. Courts no longer tolerate private lobbying by city council
members in order to influence a rezone. In addition, they will no
longer overlook irregularities at the planning commission level sim-
ply because the city council makes the final decision. Protection for
the interested party and the public increases by preserving the integ-
rity of the entire process.'5 0
amendment grounds. In doing so, however, the court neither accepted nor rejected
the appearance of fairness doctrine generally.
147. Polygon Corp. v. City of Seattle, 90 Wash. 2d 59, 578 P.2d 1309 (1978).
148. City of Seattle v. Loutsis Investment Co., Inc., 16 Wash. App. 158, 554 P.2d
379 (1976).
149. Hill v. Department of Labor and Indus., 90 Wash. 2d 276, 580 P.2d 636
(1978) (claimant's council was aware of board member's conflicting interests but
failed to assert a claim, resulting in a waiver of the claimant's right to raise the issue
subsequently). See City of Bellevue v. King County Boundary Rev. Bd., 90 Wash. 2d
856, 586 P.2d 470 (1978) (litigants may not raise a claim of conflict of interest without
having raised the issue earlier if they had information forming the basis of their bias
challenge).
150. Another possible inroad on the appearance of fairness doctine is the com-
mon law rule of necessity. This rule provides that one exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions must act in a proceeding where his jurisdiction is exclusive and
where, if disqualified, there is no legal provision for calling in a substitute. In that
case, a refusal to act would absolutely prevent a determination of the proceeding.
Annot., 39 A.L.R. 1476 (1925); 2 K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 12.04
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The appearance of fairness doctrine can be a wide-ranging weapon
which interested persons can effectively use to invalidate rezoning
proceedings. Developers, landowners, and municipal bodies must all
be careful to comply with its dictates or risk costly delays and rever-
sals. Nevertheless, predicting the doctrine's application in any given
factual situation is difficult. The vague standards of what may or
may not "appear" fair can frustrate predictions of which actions, atti-
tudes, or interests may be in violation of it. There is thus a high po-
tential for mistakes, oversights, and inadvertent improprieties.
Local planning commissioners, city council members, and commu-
nity residents often have little grasp of the doctrine's ramifications.
Thus, the conscientious attorney must ensure that his client, the city
attorney, and the municipal decisionmakers understand it. An inade-
quate explanation early on might result in the ultimate overturning of
a favorable land use decision because of a procedural appearance of
unfairness.
(1958). If more than a majority of a board is vulnerable on appearance of fairness
grounds, this rule may be applied to validate otherwise questionable zoning actions.
See, e.g., Gonsalves v. City of Dairy Valley, 265 Cal. App. 2d 400, 71 Cal. Rptr. 255
(1968) (upholding a city council's grant of a use permit by invoking the rule of neces-
sity where a majority of the councilmen owned a total of 4.1% of the outstanding
stock of the dairy cooperative seeking the permit).
For other quasi-judicial, but non-zoning, applications of the rule of necessity, see
Yamada v. Natural Disaster Claims Comm'n, 54 Hawaii 621, 513 P.2d 1001, reajd,
55 Hawaii 126, 516 P.2d 336 (1973) (upholding proceedings before defendant com-
mission); Borough of Fanwood v. Rocco, 33 N.J. 404, 165 A.2d 183 (1960) (upholding
city council denial of liquor license transfer); First Am. Bank & Trust Co. v. Ellwcin,
221 N.W.2d 509 (N.D. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1026 (1974) (upholding banking
board adjudication declaring bank insolvent).
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